The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources (Suny Series in Israeli Studies)

In the literature on strategic surprise, the majority opinion, expressed by writers like Richard Betts and Ephraim Kam, is that surprise attacks almost always succeed, and it is very hard for the victim to properly read the intelligence before it is too late. Standing in the opposite corner is Uri Bar-Joseph. In his extremely detailed analysis of the failure of Israeli intelligence on the eve of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Bar-Joseph concludes that the surprise was anything but inevitable. In fact, he argues that it should have been anticipated. In the weeks leading up to the war, Israel had numerous sources gathered from signals, human, and aerial intelligence all pointing to war. One source even handed Israel the entire Egyptian war plan! Another source warning of war was none other than King Hussein of Jordan. Many within Israel's intelligence and military apparatus argued that war was imminent. Yet when the war did break out on October 6, Israel was unprepared. Why?According to the official Israeli body set up to investigate the failure, the Agranat Commission, the fiasco was mostly due to the failure of the intelligence chiefs to properly read the numerous signals pointing towards war. Bar-Joseph agrees with this conclusion, but takes it one step further. He argues that the top two officials, Eli Zeira and Yonah Bandman, not only did not read the signals correctly, they in fact overstepped their legal bounds and prevented information pointing towards war from reaching the chief of staff and generals. A week before the war, Zeira refused to activate sensitive listening posts in Egypt that might have provided unambiguous evidence of war. He then lied to the chief of staff and told them they are in fact activated. A day before the war, Zeira delayed the transmission of a signals intercept warning of war. Moreover, Zeira was so sure the Arabs would not attack, he never even considered the possibility of an all-out war. Bandman was also sure there would be no war, and refused to include language in his reports warning even of the possibility of war. He also distorted data to make the border seem quieter than it was. The reason these two men so sure there would no war was that Israel had destroyed the Arab armies in 1967. By 1973 the Arabs were still weaker than Israel, lacking bombers and Scuds to attack Israeli air bases. Moreover, Egypt faced the massive Suez Canal, called the best anti-tank ditch in the world by Israeli generals. Therefore, the option of all-out war to cross the Canal and retake the Sinai seemingly made no sense to these men. But Egypt's Anwar Sadat did not seek to retake the entire Sinai. He simply wished to press the Israelis into negotiation for it. He realized he could not do so while Israel held all the cards. As Bar-Joseph documents, Sadat made the decision for a limited war, crossing the Suez and staying put, in late 1972. Therefore, Sadat went to war, but with limited objectives, in spite of all Israeli projections.This book is meticulously researched and documented. An enormous number of intelligence reports are shown here for the first time. The 1973 war has also been a major case for building the theory of strategic surprise, along with Pearl Harbor and Barbarossa to name only two others. Yet Bar-Josephs conclusions are entirely opposite to those of several other scholars. Both the documents presented here and the differing conclusion Bar-Joseph arrives at makes this book very important for strategic theory. In addition to the theoritical contributions, this book also makes historical contributions. Not only does Bar-Joseph explain why the surprise happened, he examines its results in the opening hours of the war. He assesses that the decision by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to send the air force north to Syria instead of focusing on the Suez Canal was a mistake, since the comportmant in the Golan was too small for planes to operate effectively. The air force would have been much better focusing on the Suez theater. Moreover, he claims Israel was fortunate that the chief of state and Prime Minister kept their cool, since Dayan and the chief of the southern front went to pieces. Yet all this would not have mattered, the author claims, if different men had been in charge instead of Zeira and Bandman. For the fact that the watchman fell asleep, Israel paid a high price indeed.

This is an excellent book explaining and laying out the facts about the Yom Kippur war.Uri Bar-Joseph does an exceptional job with all research.Just wish it had a list of all the names and their jobs to make reading a little easier.Otherwise, an excellent book!

This is an excellent treatment of a controversial topic. It is well written, detailed and comprehensive. What went wrong? How could Israeli intelligence (Aman) have failed so completely to see this "surprise attack" coming. Uri Bar-Joseph's explanation is generally accepted now, probably because of the high quality of his analysis.

Good read but with a definite Israeli Bias. Implies Israel as "victim" whereas Israel was the dominant occupying power, and Nuclear armed no less. Israeli shelling during War of Attrition of canal cities of Suez and Ismailya drove One million Egyptians out of their homes. Certainly an objective observer would consider those civilians made refugees by Israeli bombardment as the actual "victims".Goes on and compares Pearl harbor attack to 1973 Egypt/Syria attack,whereas Israel's 1967 Surprise sneak attack is more comparable. States that the Arabs deception plan was "Primitive", but it indeed catch the Israelis with their pants down!. Ashraf Marwan,"the information" Israeli asset, gets outed as a double agent in recent book. He gets "thrown off a balcony" in London as he is ready to publish a tell all book.A Primitive killing by any standard. Israel Mossad is credited by western intelligence sources in the know for the killing. So "Primitive" is selectively applied.It was then as now the Israeli Occupation of their lands that was the driving factor for Israel's foes. The prime reason for the shock was the Israeli indoctrinated perception of the inferiority of the Arabs. Cultural and martial.A PEOPLE DO NOT STAY WEAK FOREVER! If anybody should know this, the Israelis should be first!Flawed Zionism's 19th century Colonial thinking.

for the military history nerd

A thorough but crisp and well-written analysis of Israeli intelligence failure to anticipate and prepare for the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The author is laser-like in his dissection of process and personality failures in creating an organisational mindset with which a whole range of alpha males found it easiest to go along; alarming in the sense that faced with complex analysis large organisations delegate analysis and therefore delegate responsibility and control - without realising they have done so. Full of wider applicability.

Herausragend recherchierte und sehr gut lesbare Studie über die Vorgäng vor dem Yom-Kippur Krieg 1973.Nach einer Darstellung der Ausgangslage der Konfliktparteien (Syrien, Ägypten und Israel) geht der Autor sehr detailliert auf die eingehenden Lageinformationen für Israel ein. Dabei zeigt er wie entscheidende Akteure der militärischen und politischen Führungselite Israels die Informationen bewerten und welche Folgerungen sich daraus ergeben.Die feste Überzeugung des Kopfes des militärischen Nachrichtendienstes Israels, dass Ägypten keinen Krieg beginnen wird führt zu groupthink" und Kognitiven Dissonanzen in seinem Dienst. Die Studie zeigt, welche Gefahren hinter diesen Phänomenen stehen und wie schnell strategische Entscheidungen bei falscher Beratung in einer Katastrophe enden können.Gut ist, dass der Autor konsequent bei der Betrachtung der Nachrichtenlage und der Auswertung dieser bleibt. Der eigentliche Verlauf des Krieges wird nur am Rande gestreift und ist nicht im Zentrum der Betrachtung.Sehr empfehlenswert für alle, die an der Auswertung von nachrichtendienstlichen Erkenntnissen und an Prozessen von groupthink" in Organisation interessiert sind.