Okinawa 1945: The last battle (Campaign, 96)

I wish Mr Rottman had ten more pages to fill out the battle action for this battle was so difficult and intriguing with the intense defense, the difficult terrain, the Kamikaze attacks etc that I'm sure the author was confined by the page limit. If it was possible, I would have strayed from traditional format and eliminated the couple 2 page color illustrations for more room for the battle.The introduction was very good and helped set the scene for the landing and subsequent engagement. The chapters on Opposing Commanders and Opposing Forces were also excellent but it will take away from describing the 3 month battle. There was only 33 pages devoted to the battle while other Osprey books can have 50 pages or more. This really short changed the battle action.The photos were very good; they helped show the difficult terrain our marines and soldiers had to contend with while fighting the enemy. Most of the maps were good as well, especially the three 3-D maps. Once again, these maps help show the terrain and the relative positions of the terrain obstacles.Within page limits, Mr Rottman has done a good job with this book, like he has with his other books, but feel too much time was spent on the prehistory and not enough on the difficult battle. Its still recommended. For further reading Roy Appleman's or EB Sledge's books will add to your understanding of the battle. If you want the absolute best maps of the campaign then you'll need the book by Chas Nichols.

The Osprey format of getting in everything in 96 pages sets any book up immediately for some strong and weak points. First and foremost, this book is way too short to get any real understanding of this battle in either strategic or tactical terms. Forget about the human element, the suffering and sacrifice of the Okinawan people: there is just way too much to cover in a booklet this size.But that shouldn't stop anyone from using this very useful forumulaic book as a companion to a serious read about this Battle. The book's maps make some of the geography easier to understand. You have a sense of where the Marines are, where the Army is and where the two divisions and 1 Brigade of the Japanese army are locked in battle. I find this critical to understanding the movement and retaining any knowledge of a battle. In this sense, the book is a very good help.The Book is divided roughly in two: the events, strategy, dispositions and planning before the invasion and, the invasion and battle. About 2/3 is dedicated to the events and considerations outside the actual battle. Troop planning, tactics, troop disposition and armaments. This sets up the ground well and also allows one to understand who is engaging who... it also helps to understand the numerous landings on the islands in the region (the largest being on Ie Shima and its accompanying battle). This detail is helpful.The last sections on the actual battle are really only thumbnail sketches, but they are useful for understanding and supplementing other books on the battle (usually almost always with the de rigeur lack of maps). In this sense I think that the book is a fair and valuable addition to the Osprey collection.

Charts, maps and photographs all well done and instructive, but no great analytical sophistication (which in this case is not really needed for the purpose of quick and accurate information).

Very good report on the Battle.

Great book with informative maps and pictures.

Excellent

Great!

Former Green Beret Gordon L. Rottman provides an excellent summary of America's last great amphibious invasion of the Second World War in Osprey's Campaign #96, Okinawa 1945. Quite simply, this is one of the better titles in Osprey's campaign series and shows that it is possible to pack a great deal about a major military operation into a 96-page format. This book is particularly useful as a case study for military officers, thanks to the author's attention to many pertinent details that escape most civilian authors. Overall, Okinawa 1945 is a "must-have" for anyone interested in the later stages of the Pacific War. Although Rottman follows the standard Osprey campaign format, the opening chapters of this volume are far more in-depth than virtually all the other titles in the series. An 11-page introduction covers the history and terrain of Okinawa, as well as the American strategic debate about whether to invade Okinawa or Formosa. The section on opposing plans is also quite detailed, totaling 10 pages. Seven pages are used to cover opposing high-level commanders on both sides. Another 12 pages are used to cover opposing forces, including succinct but detailed discussions of tactical organization and strength and weaknesses of each major unit. Pertinent characteristics are included; such as each US Army division in the invasion was about 1,000 infantrymen under strength due to a shortage of replacements and the fact that one of the two Japanese divisions on the island had no organic artillery. Taken together, Rottman provides a far more detailed introduction to the campaign than any other Osprey title, by spending fully 52% of the volume on the background material. Unfortunately, the strength of the introduction leads to the weakness of the main campaign narrative that - while good - is overly succinct. The invasion itself is covered in 33 pages: sections on the initial landings, the continuing offensive, actions at sea, and the push southward. There are three color battle scenes: Japanese suicide boats at Naha, Marines reducing a bunker and the virtual annihilation of the US 193rd Tank Battalion on 19 April 1945. There are a total of five 2-D maps (strategic situation, Okinawa, the initial landings, the Ie Shima assault, and the withdrawal of the 32nd Army)and three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (the Japanese counteroffensive on May 4-6, 1945, the Battle for Sugar Loaf Hill, and the final stand in the south). The author also effectively uses footnotes at the end of each section to provide additional details. Okinawa 1945 has a great many strengths. The author's discussion of terrain and weather (e.g. the impact of rain on operations) greatly enhances the reader's appreciation for the operational environment. Rottman also makes very good use of statistics, particularly concerning military and civilian casualties. For example, I was unaware that 153 of 354 American tanks used on Okinawa were knocked out by the Japanese - a 43% loss rate for US armor. Nor was I aware that fully one-third of Okinawa's civilian population died in the campaign. The author also covers the challenges of civil-military operations (CMO); the US military had to screen and care for over 285,000 indigenous civilians on Okinawa. The introduction of some new weapons - such as the American 75mm recoilless rifles is discussed, as well as how both sides adapted their tactics based upon lessons learned from previous island battles. In particular, the Japanese adoption of defense-in-depth and attritional tactics allowed the Americans to get ashore at low cost, but provided the basis for a bloody, protracted campaign. Finally, the author provides a superb order of battle for both sides, including information on support units such as signal, engineer, medical, quartermaster, and MPs. Even the US Marine Corps' three canine platoons are included. The only real disadvantage of Okinawa 1945 - which is the overly short shrift given to the main battles on the Shuri Line - is not the author's fault, but rather due to Osprey's size limits. The last six weeks of the campaign are covered in about six pages, which leaves room for only a bare-bones account. No eyewitness accounts are incorporated into the campaign narrative, which could have been used to add intensity and grunt-level perspective. Otherwise, the campaign seems just like flags moving on a map, without real soldiers bleeding and dying. The maps are also a bit inadequate, particularly since no map depicts the initial battles or dispositions on the Machinato Line. The question of General Buckner's operational plans is also studiously avoided; over 7,600 Americans died on Okinawa and the question should have been raised if these losses were excessive. Due to the Japanese concentration of most of their forces in the south of the island, Buckner was able to land his troops and occupy the vital airfields and more than two-thirds of the island at the cost of fewer than 500 dead. The Americans came to Okinawa to get the airfields and they succeeded in seizing them at very low cost. Was it really necessary to engage the remaining Japanese garrison - hopelessly trapped in one corner of the island - in a bloody attritional battle for over 80 days? With so many Japanese garrisons bypassed across the Pacific, it seems odd that Buckner never considered sealing the Japanese 32nd Division off and slowly reducing them to impotence by bombardment and starvation. Particularly given the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew of the impending Atomic Bomb raids, it seems odd that so many American leaders would endorse an attritional battle like Okinawa at this stage of the war.

海外の戦史家が沖縄戦をどう見ているのか気になるところですが、この本はあくまで軍事上の観点、それも米軍の視点から描いています。全体像を知りたい人は学研の「沖縄決戦」がいいかもしれません。