The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost Paperback – 23 May 2019

Many decades of History reading have served to narrow (if that’s the right word) my favorite eras/subjects to Victoriana and military history, particularly of the French & Indian War and World War I. That narrowing brings with it the specter of repetition, the recurring threat that one is going to end up reading the same-old, same-old for the simple reason that there are only so many ways of recounting familiar facts. So I’ve developed a simple test to apply to any new work I undertake. I want the author to tell me something I didn’t know of, if I knew it, make me think about it in a different way, see it in a different light.I took a bit of a flyer with “Allure.” It really isn’t focused on my areas of interest. But I found the book’s premise intriguing and instinctively sensible: that wars are won or lost not on the basis of decisive battles planned and executed by brilliant generals, but rather by attrition, by relentless wearing down. Well, OK, you say. Someone who knows what he’s talking about should be able to defend that thesis in a thousand or so words and a couple of pages. Nolan takes 582 pages of text, more’s the pity! I would have been happy to stick around for another 100 or so.If you, like me, find yourself scanning text that is not “news” to you, better concentrate when reading “Allure” because every sentence is worth reading and every sentence advances the narrative with repetition used sparingly and strictly for either emphasis or clarity. Indeed, I purposely slowed my reading pace to savor Nolan’s marvelous writing style, stopping short many times to picture the author laboring over a particularly insightful or enlightening offering.In case you don’t have my drift by now, “Allure” is one of the best works of History I’ve read in years. As you put it down, you may or may not be convinced of Nolan’s hypothesis, but I guarantee you will never read another military history work without framing it in Nolan’s terms. I may have to refine my “new” or “different” test because Nolan has demonstrated to me that what I thought I knew I didn’t really understand. That’s the greatest accolade I can bestow.

Excellent work documenting that the concept of the "decisive battle" that will win a war is has little basis in actual historical fact. Nolan traces the idea of the decisive battle from Roman times (Cannae) to the recent US intervention in Iraq; except for three instances in the 1860-70's (the Prussian wars on Denmark, Austria, and France), no battles have proved decisive. There have been more than a few tactical geniuses (e.g., Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Moltke) but they all lost their wars because of their inability to see beyond individual battles to define and pursue a strategic war-ending goal. As a result, almost all of the wars ended up in a fight-to-exhaustion, where the winner was inevitably the side with more materiel and more soldiers. Nonetheless the myth of the military genius and the decisive battle retains its hold on the popular imagination and on many politicians and military leaders. Nolan's book should be required reading for everyone in the US National Security team, and all members of the general staff in major militaries around the world.

This is a truly excellant book pointing out the severe limitations of military power. It shows, with unflinching logic that the idea of battles winning wars is in extremis and that it is other conditions that have to be taken into account. It deals with the ulimate failure of `charismatic' leaders who apparently were `winning' when ultimately, their actions led to the destruction of their nations or empires. From Hannibal to Napoleon via Frederick the Great, he shows that the argument of the war winning strategy of inflicting losses in battles is not necessarily a winning strategy. Often, early `wins' lead to tactical errors and often, the lack of strategic thinking leads to ultimately losing everything. After all, everybody thinks of Napoleon as a great leader, yet he led France to ultimate failure. The 100 days was, in fact, never going to win anything for Napoleon.The writer shows a great prescience in understanding the problems of the First World War, but rightly castigates the German High Command for ever imagining that they could actually win it. Even Moltke, after his experience of the Franco Prussian war of 1870 realised that attacking other nations and winning immediate battles was no guide to the ultimate ends of the conflicts.The book is well researched and I would argue that all politicians and military command centres should read this as an instruction manual on how not to start a conflict and the fallaciousness of the `quick war' argument. The author does not deal with Afghantistan or Iraq, but I suggest, that if Bush and Blair had had its contents available it might have made them think again, although perhaps not, knowing the level of their intellects.I cannot recommend this book highly enough and it absolutely clear for the general reader. It might make hard points and make people reassess their thinking, but it is not a `hard read' but an extremely intelligent and well written book discussing a subject that too few politicians and generals seem capable of understanding.

Exzellentes Buch, das einige neue Perspektiven eröffnet. Die Kernthese, nämlich dass die Hoffnung auf eine Vernichtungsschlacht und einen kurzen Krieg die Deutschen in zwei ungewinnbare Kriege lockte, wird zwar etwas oft wiederholt, ist aber dennoch überzeugend und wichtig. Liest sich sehr gut, ist nicht akademisch langfädig und ist ein guter Streifzug durch die Militärgeschichte mit Fokus auf die Bedeutung von Stellungskrieg und Logistik versus vermeintlich entscheidenden Schlachten.

Delivered on time and undamaged.