Portugal’s War in Angola

Books on Portuguese Africa in the 20th Century are few and fewer. This covers some ground not well known by most in the USA or the world. The conflict in Southern Africa was ultimately one of the hottest of the Cold War, yet perhaps the racial stereotype of the "Black Conflicts" were what kept the Western World colour blind. This book does give a lot of statistics and some insight as to the end of a 500 year Empire with Angola the jewel of the crown. The collapse of Portuguese Africa with the Carnation Revolution led to the ultimate end for Rhodesia and eventually Apartheid South Africa, and even hotter warfare in Angola as it was bled dry by Cuban, Russian, South African and Western designs. It also details the great flaws of Portuguese Colonial policies and why unlike France and the UK, Portugal did not realize it's mistake in their programs in Africa until it was too late.

“Portugal's War in Angola” is an almost must-have when it comes to interest in post-World War II colonial wars. The book is another virtual diamond in the rough concerning little known information about Portugal’s three colonial wars that were fought from 1961-1971. The hardest thing for me to understand is why I had never heard of these wars until this book; I mean I enjoy reading all types of military history, but these wars received little, if any press coverage from the American media during their duration. The absolute most interesting thing is that these colonial wars were raging almost simultaneously with our very own colonial-type war in Vietnam. Perhaps that, in a nutshell, is why these wars are minutely known and understood here in the States.The book does a terrific job of breaking down how difficult the Portuguese had it when trying to effectively wage, and win, essentially three Vietnam styled wars all at one time. The odd thing for the reader to comprehend at first is that they actually fared somewhat better than we did in Nam, and with exponentially less resources at their disposal might I say. The book does a wonderful job of providing relevant statistics and provides great insight into why Portugal’s 500-year Empire finally collapsed in the mid-1970s. Portugal’s colonies in Africa were separated by large tracts of land and lacked military coordination, but Angola was to remain the jewel of the empire until the very end and required immense Portuguese resources to keep it in the fold. No matter how much effort and finances Portugal put into the retention of their colonies, the Carnation Revolution eventually led to government back home to end the wars and grant freedom to the former colonies. This outcome, however, had many ramifications to many people; the Portuguese end in Africa spelled eventual doom for both white rule in Rhodesia and South Africa by 1994. The saddest thing for many, especially the Angolans, was that even after independence their nation would be torn wide open by civil war and an escalation of military presence in Africa by Cold War enemies like the Soviets, Cubans, South Africans and even many Western nations. This book covers all that is needed to understand the conflicts and its beginning and eventual end, and it concisely and poignantly reminds readers of why war should never be the first way to solve world issues.If you, like me, have any interest in post-World War II colonial conflicts in Africa or elsewhere, this book is an almost must-have for your collection. I enjoyed it thoroughly and am sure you would as well.

Portugals War in Angola: 1961-1974Author = W.S. van der Waals* Paperback: 317 pages* Publisher: Protea Boekhuis (March 30, 2012)* Language: English* ISBN-10: 1869193512* ISBN-13: 978-1869193515Books on war or military history can be categorized much the same way as military operations are; Tactical, Operational, and Strategic. The Tactical is the memoir, the story of a person in events. This is an increasingly popular form of history since the rise of the social history movement in the late 1960's especially the story of the normal person and not "the big man." The Operational is a detailed study of units and tactics and battle. This is typically the purview of professionals, historians, and gamers. The last is the big picture approach showing the politics behind the choices and the goals. How these shaped the military strategy and results. This is the Clausewitz level. Typically in military history the first two are popular and the last is not.This book is in the later group. It is a book heavy on motivation and why choices were made rather than on the mud, sweat, and blood. It does an excellent job of laying out the historical context of the conflict. This context includes demographics, geography, economy, colonial and pre-colonial society and infrastructure. The author then gives us good backgrounds on both the Angolans and the Portuguese at the beginning of the armed conflict in1961.The author then moves to the year 1961 and lays the ground work for the struggle. Included are a discussion of Portuguese methods and goals as well as the goals and methods of the disparate rebel groups. When it impacts the events in Angola the author describes events in Portugal, NATO, the larger international community, and Portugal's other colonies in Africa and Asia.Following the out break of hostilities the author breaks the rest of the conflict into three phases. The initial struggle, the Portuguese push back and stabilization, followed by the 1974 coup d'état in Portugal that rendered the continuation of hostilities in Angola between the rebels and the Portuguese as moot. He follow sup with an epilogue and an appendix on insurgency, revolutionary war and counter methodologies. The Appendix is worth the price for its succinct and clear explanations of these types of operations.This book is an excellent companion piece to "Counterinsurgency in Africa the Portuguese Way of War; 1961-1974" by John P. Cann. They both cover the conflict but in different aspects. The Cann book is an analysis of tactics, organization, and methods of all three Portuguese struggles against de-colonization while this book focuses on Angola. They are both extremely valuable as they present a little studied conflict(s) which because of Portugal's impoverishment in 1961 and through the war present a study of war from a view point wholly alien to the US experience and expectation of war.The Portuguese began the conflict with three concepts which are alien to the US way of war since the end of World War Two. They knew they lacked material and money, they accepted a strategy of protraction, and they realized that wars are political and not military.Portugal began the conflict from a position of low economic power and manpower, forced to fight at an extreme distance without adequate logistics capabilities. The Portuguese forced their military on the ground to operate with what they had rather than attempting to bankrupt the state in order to make sure the troops had everything they needed. This lack of manpower and material forced the Portuguese to innovate locally in reaction to events on the ground. In most cases these innovations proved positive. Though a NATO member Portugal was not allowed to dip into NATO stocks and was cast in the UN and by the US as a pariah state for refusing to free its colonies. They went to war with what they had and made do.The second aspect was the length of the conflict. At the outset many of the Portuguese commanders thought that the war would last 10-20 years rather then believing that they would be home by Christmas. The politicians also accepted this prognostication and the Portuguese settled in for a long drawn out struggle. Part of this was the nature of the conflict as they viewed it. The other part was that they made a deliberate choice to fight a protracted struggle because of their own weaknesses. The Portuguese made a deliberate choice to limit manpower and use low level technology. They choice to fight a light infantry war in order to prevent escalation by their foes and to keep their own casualties at a manageable level. This is similar to US Army methods during the 100+ year long Indian Wars.The third basic understanding that shaped Portuguese methods was the Clausewitzian notion that war is less about military action then about politics. A military force engaging primarily in combat will not solve or meet indigenous political demands and needs. That you can win by military means but you can loose by military means. They emphasized that the struggle would result in a political accommodation or settlement. They felt that the job of the military was to shape the environment so that the enemy would not be dictating the term sand condition of the settlement but rather that the Portuguese would be managing the results with popular support among the masses. The goal was to force the enemy to the negotiating table more or less on Portuguese or at least neutral terms that were not wholly stacked against the Portuguese.Later on the Portuguese realized that decolonization would eventually come. The goal was not to deny it but to control it so that the former colonies would remain in a type of Portuguese common wealth with strong economic and cultural ties to Portugal. In other words if you can not control their economies at least you would be their first choice as a trading partner.In the end the Portuguese mostly succeeded in the colonies but were undone by weariness at home and a military coup in Portugal forced Portugal to leave its colonies sooner than they had originally intended. The sudden collapse of will from the Portuguese left a power vacuum in their former colonies ... a vacuum that they have only really stared to emerge from in the last seven or so years.A book well worth spending the time to read and ponder.

Written by a South African military officer for South African Defense Force but has been adapted for the general reader.Found it a good history book though I tend to like books that have some personal antidotes or stories from participants to get an emotion feel versus sttaight history.Should be part of any reading about Portugals Colonial Wars.

GOOD DETAIL

I had imagined this would be a purely military account of the war between the "mine and the helicopter" but instead its author, a South African COIN expert, views Angola in the round as part of its history, geography, economy and people. The role of other nations, and especially the Cold War are all reflected on as the Portuguese government edges towards a more liberal policy and the three liberation movements develop in different ways. There are some valuable thoughts on how each of them developed a peoples war.